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SOME PROBLEMS OF PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS
IN WEST VIRGINIA
ROBERT EVANS STEALEY*
In West Virginia prior to 1891 unless a preference fell within
the classification of a fraudulent or voluntary transfer or conveyance
it was not inhibited.1 There is a vast difference, historically and
actually, between a fraudulent conveyance and a preference, and
the consequences to the parties involved that may flow from each.
The condemnation of fraudulent conveyances by statute is ancient;2
that of preferential transfers a modern development of the law.
It is not the purpose here to deal with fraudulent or voluntary
transfers or conveyances, but only with certain aspects of prefer-
ences, involving principally those effected by a sale or conveyance
to a third person or by a direct or indirect payment in money.
The common law not only condoned but encouraged the
obtaining of preferences by diligent creditors. The race was to
the swift. As it was put by Judge Brannon in Herold v. Barlow:
Member of the Kanawha County bar.
I Fraudulent and voluntary conveyances by an insolvent debtor are regulated
by W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 1, §§1, 2, 3 and 4 (1931). Except for the inclusion in
§3 by the Revisers of that CODE of a definition, partial or complete, of the terms
transfer or charge, §§1 and 2 retain almost the literal language of VA. CODE C. 118,
§§1 and 2 (1849), and are the same as §5184 and §5185 of the present (1942)
Virginia Code. Said §§l, 2 and 3 of the W. VA. CODE are as follows: Section (1)
"Every gift, conveyance, assignment, or transfer of, or charge upon any estate,
real or personal, every suit commenced, or decree, judgment, or execution
suffered or obtained, %nd every bond or other writing given, with intent to delay,
hinder, or defraud creditors, purchasers, or other persons, of or from what they
are or may be lawfully entitled to, shall as to such creditors, purchasers, or
other persons, their representatives or assigns, be void. This section shall not
affect the title of a purchaser for valuable consideration, unless it appear that
he had notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor, or of the fraud
rendering void the title of such grantor."
Section (2) "In sections three, four and five of this article the word 'trans-
fer' shall be taken to include every gift, sale, conveyance or assignment; and the
word 'charge' shall be taken to include every confessed judgment, trust deed,
mortgage, lien or encumbrance."
Section (3) "Every transfer or charge which is not upon consideration
deemed valuable in law shall be void as to creditors whose debts shall have been
contracted at the time it was made; but shall not, upon that account merely,
be void as to creditors whose debts shall have been contracted, or as to purchasers
who shall have purchased, after it was made; and though it be decreed to be
void as to a prior creditor because voluntary, it shall not for that cause be
decreed to be void as to subsequent creditors or purchasers."
2 13 ELiz. c. 5; 27 Euz. c. 4, in force in Virginia prior to the revolution, and
enacted by the General Assembly in 1785, c. 64, effective from Jan. 1, 1787. See
VA. R.v. CODE c. 101 (1819).
3 47 W. Va. 750, 755, 36 S. E. 8 (1901).
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"By the common law it is perfectly lawful in a creditor to
obtain, and in a debtor to give a creditor, preference over other
creditors, if the intent is merely to prefer a creditor, and not
to hinder or defraud other creditors. Such preferences may
injure, but it does not defraud, other creditors .... It makes
no difference about the secret motives of the creditor, as the
law takes no cognizance of such motives, and cannot assign a
bad motive to an act not wrong either in itself or in its
consequences, because, in law, a motive having a lawful end
in view, and resulting in proper action, not condemned by
law, cannot be called a bad motive. Here self-preservation is
regarded as the law of nature. It makes no difference that
the creditor knows that the party is insolvent when he gets
his preference .... He defeats other creditors lawfully to save
his own honest debt. He simply uses diligence to save himself,
and the law rewards that diligence by giving him its fruits.
It is immaterial how such lawful preference is accomplished,
whether by absolute conveyance of the fee, or by mere mortgage
of judgment."
Except as modified by the Bankruptcy Act 4 this is yet the law
of Virginia. There the only transfers or charges made by an
insolvent debtor which can be attacked by a creditor are those
without consideration or fraudulent in fact.5 And the Virginia
rule is the prevalent state of the law in the vast majority of the
states, as Ohio appears to be the only state other than West Virginia
having a general preference act.6 The original West Virginia
4 40 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, II U. S. C. §96 (a) (1946).
5 VA. CODE §§5184, 5185 (1942). See note 1, supra. In Surratt v. Eskridge,
131 Va. 325, 108 S. E. 677 (1921), the Virginia law is summed up thus: "Now
at common law and under the Virginia statute against fraudulent conveyances
it is well settled, and is unquestioned before us, that an insolvent debtor, known
by himself at the time to be insolvent, may make a valid conveyance of a portion
or the whole of his assets to a bona fide creditor or creditors, in satisfaction oi
on account of existing indebtedness if, that is the sole purpose of the debtor, and
the transfer is for full value, although such conveyance may and is intended by
the grantor and grantee or grantees to give such creditor or creditors a preference
to the exclusion of others in the distribution of the assets of the debtor. In such
case other creditors are not lawfully entitled to any share in the assets transferred
to the preferred creditor or creditors. Wht the law sanctions cannot be regarded
as unlawful. In such case it is only where the transfer is not made with the
sole purpose on the part of the debtor of making a bona fide preference among
his creditors, and where that is merely an incident of the transactions, used as
a cloak for some other purpose which is fraudulent in actual intent, that the
transfer is regarded as unlawful."
6 OHIo GEN. CODE §11104 (1938). Several other states have statutes
regulating assignments for the benefit of creditors and conveyances or transfers
by insolvent corporations. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, which
hs been adopted in twenty states, does not affect preferences, §3 thereof
providing that an antecedent debt shall constitute fair consideration for a
conveyance by an insolvent debtor.
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statute as passed in 1891 took the form of an amendment to the
section on voluntary conveyances. 7 In 1895 it was revised and
amended8 in certain particulars which will be hereafter noted. The
Revisers of the 1931 Code transferred to another section the defini-
tions of transfer as including every "gift, sale, conveyance or assign-
rient" and charge as including every "confessed judgment, trust
deed, mortgage, lien or encumbrance" 9 , and placed the remainder
of the 1895 act, without amendment, as c. 40, art. 1, §5,10 where it
yet remains, without change.
7 W. Va. Acts 1891, c. 123, amending W. VA. CODE e 74, §2 (1868), derived
from VA. CODE c. 118, §2 (1849). The act added the following after the original
language of the section which declared void voluntary transfers: ". . . and
every gift, sale, conveyance, assignment, transfer or charge, made by an insolvent
debtor to a trustee, assignee, or otherwise, giving or attempting to give a
priority or preference to a creditor or creditors of such insolvent debtor, or
which provides or attempts to provide for the payment, in whole or in part,
of a creditor or creditors of such insolvent debtor, to the exclusion or prejudice
of other creditors, shall be void as to such priority, preference or payment so
made or attempted to be made; and all such gifts, sales, conveyances, assignments,
transfers and charges, shall be deemed void as to such priority, preference or
payment; and every such gift, sale, conveyance, assignment, transfer or charge
shall be deemed, taken and held to be made for the benefit of all the creditors
of such debtor except as hereinafter provided; and all the estate, property and
assets given, sold, conveyed, assigned, transferred or charged as aforesaid, shall
be applied upon the debts and paid to the creditors of such insolvent'debtor,
pro rata; Provided, That nothing in this section shall be taken or construed to
change, impair or affect any prior lien, priority or incumbrance acquired by
a creditor on the real estate of such debtor in any manner now prescribed by
law; Provided further, That nothing in this act contained shall be taken or
construed to change or impair or affect the transfer, sale or assignment of bonds,
notes, stocks, securities or other evidences of debt in payment of, or as collateral
security for, the payment of a bona fide debt or to secure any endorser or surety,
whether said transfer, sale or assignment is made at the time said debt is
contracted or endorsement made, or for the payment or security of a pre.existing
debt."
8 W. Va. Acts 1895, c. 4. The text is the same as the present act (note 10,
infra), except that the definition of transfer or charge was placed in another sec-
tion. (See note 9, infra).
9W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 1, §3 (1931).
10 "Every t&ansfer or charge made by an insolvent debtor attempting to
prefer any creditor of such insolvent debtor, or to secure such a creditor or any
surety or indorser for a debt to the exclusion or prejudice of any other creditor,
shall be void as to such preference or security, but shall be thken to be for the
benefit of all creditors of such debtor, and all the property so attempted to be
transferred or charged shall be applied and paid pro rata upon all the debts
owned by such debtor at the time such transfer or charge is made. Provided,
That any such transfer or charge by an insolvent debtor shall be valid as to
such preference or priority unless a creditor of such insolvent debtor shall in-
stitute a suit in chancery within one year after such transfer or charge was
made to set aside and avoid the same and cause the property so transferred or
charged to be applied toward the payment pro rata of all the debts of such in-
solvent debtor existing at the time such transfer or charge is made, subject, how-
ever, to the provisions hereinafter contained with reference to creditors uniting in
such suit and contributing to the expenses thereof. But if such transfer or
charge be admitted to record within eight months after it is made, then such
3
Stealey: Some Problems of Preferential Transfers in West Virginia
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1950
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
It might have been expected that a statute so in derogation
of the common law, and constituting such an innovation, would
receive a strict construction by the court. But in the first case
decided under it a contrary intention appeared. In Wolf v.
McGugin,n decided January 28, 1893, under the original 1891 act,
it was held that insolvency meant an insufficiency of all the debtor's
property to pay all his debts, 12 and that whether the preferred
creditor had notice or knowledge of the fact of insolvency was
immaterial.13 And in Baer Sons Grocer Co. v. Williams14 the court
held that a deed of trust to secure a bona fide present loan of money,
executed when the grantor was insolvent, was a preference, because
the statute made no exception in such case. Also, there being no
period of limitation provided for the bringing of suits to set aside
suit to be availing must be brought within four months after such transfer or
chhrge was admitted to record. Every such suit shall be deemed to be brought
in behalf of the plaintiff and all other creditors of such insolvent debtor, but
the creditor instituting such suit or proceeding, together with all creditors of
such insolvent debtor who shall come into the suit and unite with the plaintiff
before final decree and agree to contribute to the costs and expenses of such
suit, shall be entitled to have their claims first paid in full pro rata out of the
property so transferred or charged, in preference to any creditor of such debtor
who shall before final decree decline or fail so to unite and agree to contribute
to the costs and expenses of such suit, but not in preference to such creditor
as may attempt to sustain the preference given him by such transfer or charge:
Provided further, That nothing in this section shall be taken to prevent the
making of a preference as security for the payment of purchase money or a bona
fide loan of money or other bona fide debt contracted at the time such transfer
or charge was made, or as security for one who at the time of such transfer or
charge becomes an indorser or surety for the payment of money then borrowed;
And provided further, That nothing in this section contwined shall be taken to
affect any transfer of bonds, notes, stocks, securities or other evidences of debt
in payment of or as collateral security for the payment of, a bona fide debt, or
to secure any indorser or surety, whether such transfer is made at the time such
debt is contracted or indorsement made or for the payment or security of a
preexisting debt."
11 37 W. Va. 552, 16 S. E. 797 (1893).
12 This definition has been consistently followed, except as to banks, Ream's
Drug Store v. Bank, 115 W. Va. 66, 174 S. E. 788 (1934); Carr v. Summerfield,
47 W. Va. 115, 34 S. E. 804 (1901).
13 The Bankruptcy Act has always required on the part of the creditor rea-
sonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent, or that a preference would be ef-
fected at the time of the transfer, to constitute a voidable preference. 30 STAT.
562 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §96 (1946). Any such preference may be
avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby
or his agent acting with reference thereto has, at the time when the transfer is
made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent." Section 60 (b)
of Act of 1898 (30 STAT. 562) used the test "shll have had reasonable cause to
believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference."
14 43 W. Va. 323, 27 S. E. 345, decided January 19, 1897, involving a trans-
fer under the original 1891 Act.
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preferences, it was held that only the equitable doctrine of laches
would restrict the time.1"
The latter two holdings pointed up inadvertencies of the 1891
act which probably caused the 1895 revision, although the cases
were decided after the amendment. A limitation of one year, or
four months after the recordation of a recordable instrument, was
provided. Any suit by a creditor was to be a "class" suit and not,
as in the case of a suit to set aside a transfer as fraudulent in fact,
for the prior benefit of the first plaintiff. And preferences given
for a present consideration were excluded.""
As amended, apart from the proviso excepting a transfer of
"bonds, notes, stocks, securities or other evidences of debt" from
its operation, the statute would seem well designed to attain its
evident object-a fair distribution of the estate of an insolvent
debtor among his creditors' 7  The reason for the proviso is not
apparent. It would appear necessary in order to protect the free
negotiability of such paper as subsequent bona fide purchasers for
value, without notice, would be protected under other principles
of law, and the proviso could have been expressly so limited, if
thought needful.' s The Bankrupty Act contains no such exception.
It specifically covers the transfer of "any property" of the bank-
rupt.19 There being no logical reason for the exception in the
West Virginia statute, as long as it remains there it should be con-
strued as narrowly as possible so that it will conform as nearly as
can be to the coverage of the Bankruptcy Act. But subsequent inter-
pretation apparently expanded its scope.The court first held that
transfers of paper within the exception were governed by the
common law,2 0 and, shortly thereafter, that an "evidence of debt"
15 Hero]d v. Barlow, 47 W. Va. 750, 36 S. E. 8 (1900), holding that a delay
of four years and four months constituted laches; Casto v. Greer, 44 W. Va.
332, 33 S. E. 110 (1897), holding that the limitation period in the 1895 amend-
nient operated prospectively only.
16 See notes 8, 10, supra.
17 As it was succinctly put in Baer & Sons v. Williams, note 14, supra, by
Dent, J.: "In other words, the insolvent debtor's property being limited, the
design of the law is to prevent his disposition thereof in such manner as to have
the same applied on some of his debts, to the exclusion of others, and to cause
the same to be divided pro rata, that all may share alike."
18 For example, see the proviso protecting holders in due course of negoti-
able paper from the lien of an execution duly docketed in W. VA. CODE c. 88,
art. 4, §10 (1981).
19 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §96 (1946).
20 Frank v. Zeigler, 46 W. Va. 614, 33 S. E. 761 (1899). In this case the
transferees of the notes failed to benefit by the exception. Z, insolvent, sold a
stock of goods to S, his son-in-law, who gave promissory notes for the purchase
price to Z, who transferred the same to three banks to which he was indebted.
5
Stealey: Some Problems of Preferential Transfers in West Virginia
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1950
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
included an assignment of an open account,21 although the language
would seem to include only evidence of debt executed at the time
of the creation of the debt, and intended to be evidence thereof,
such as bonds or notes.
Concurrently and mixed with the problem as to the scope of the
proviso arose the question as to whether the statute covered indirect
as well as direct transfers whereby a creditor was preferred.
In several cases the debtor sold to a third person, sometimes a
creditor and sometimes not,22 who thereupon gave his notes for
the purchase price, or a part thereof, to designated creditors of the
debtor, or directly paid named creditors in money. In such situation
are the creditors thus preferred compelled to account to the attack-
ing creditor for the preference thus received by them, or are they
protected by the exception, or some other principle of law? There
are two lines of cases which cannot be reconciled.
In Wolf v. McGugin,23 one M sold to A and B a stock of
goods for which they agreed to discharge certain notes payable to
Certain attaching creditors brought suit to set the sale aside as fraudulent. The
court held it to be fraudulent in fact and void in toto, whereby the attaching
creditors have priority over the bank. Although the facts are basically the
same, the problem involved in Merchants & Co. v. Whitescarver, note 28, infra,
and similar cases as to whether the giving of notes in such circumstances con-
stituted a transfer within the proviso was not discussed, the finding of fraud
in esse making it unnecessary.
21 Car v. Summerfield, 47 W. Va. 155, 34 S. E. 804 (1899). In Small Ferrer,
Inc. v. Ware, 68 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1934), where certain creditors claimed that an
assignment of funds due from certain fire insurance companies was good be-
cause made more thuan four months prior to bankruptcy, under 30 STAT. 562
(1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §96 (1946), the court held that it was neverthe-
less void because covered by W. VA. CODE C. 40, art. 1, §5 (1931) and not within
the exception, the court confining the meaning of the exception to "stocks, bonds,
notes, etc., the physical possession of which would be transferred to the pledgee
in accordance with ordinary commercial practice, not to shield a transfer by
way of assignment of incorporeal assets, made with a view of granting a prefer-
ence to certain favored creditors." Carr v. Summerfield was not cited. In view
of Erie R. R. v. Tomkins, 304 U. S. 64, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1937), holding that
federal courts must follow the decisions of state courts of last resort in matters
of local law, the case seems valueless as a precedent, although it certainly ex-
presses the better view.
22 If the purchaser was a creditor, he would be permitted to share pro
rata for the amount of his debt with the attacking creditors, Wilson v. Carrico,
50 W. Va. 336, 40 S. E. 439 (1901); Westinghouse Lamp Co. v. Ingram, 70 W. Va.
664, 74 S. E. 941 (1912); or, if part cash was paid the purchasing creditor would
be entitled to preference for the cash paid the debtor, Moore v. Thorn, 112
IV. Va. 37, 163 S. E. 617 (1932); Herold v. Barlow, 47 W. Va. 750, 36 S. E. 8
(1901). So that the core of the problem is the right of attacking creditors to
reach the cash or notes in the bands of other preferred creditors to whom they
may have been delivered, and declare the notes void or require the creditor who
has been paid in cash to refund.
23 37 W. Va. 552, 16 S. E. 797 (1893). This sale would not be voidable under
the Bulk Sales Law, W. VA. CODE C. 40, art. 2 (1931), first enacted by W. Va.
Acts 1909, c. 78, §1.
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B made by M, and A and B gave a note to a third party creditor to
discharge another debt of M. B had previously endorsed the notes
payable to him and delivered them to a third party. It was held
that the transaction constituted a preference in its entirety, the
court saying with respect to a preferential transfer:
"It means any act done by an insolvent debtor devoting any
part of his property in any way, so that its legal effect is to
give preference to one creditor over another. No matter about
the form of the instrument . . .. where as in this case, the sale
is to an absolute purchaser, with a provision that he devote
the purchase money to preferred creditors, we ought to regard
the transfer valid to pass title, and hold only the purchase-
money liable to all creditors .... if a person purchase property
of an insolvent debtor, not for cash, but agree as a part of the
transaction to devote the consideration to pay certain creditors
of the seller to the exclusion of others, that is an act falling
under the bar of the statute."
This came very close to the theory that any transfer which
diminishes the insolvent debtor's estate to the benefit of an existing
creditor is preferential and void.2 4 It was, and is, obviously the
theory which would most nearly effectuate the purpose of the act.
Otherwise, through the indirect means of a sale, with the purchaser
as a conduit, a preference could be effected which would be voidable
if made directly.
The judicial climate soon changed, however, and in three
cases beginning with Merchants S Co. v. Whitescarver,25 which
involved a factual situation almost indistinguishable from the
Wolf case, the court, without citing that case, in effect overruled it,
holding that the making of the purchase money notes by the pur-
chaser directly to creditors was a transfer within the exception and
that, even without the exception, the giving of the notes would
have been good as a "payment" of creditors by the debtor, saying,
"if the sale to [M] had been made for cash, the firm could have
taken the money and paid off these debts, and neither the plaintiffs
nor any other of their creditors could have recovered it." This
is the first intimation that a payment in money would not con-
24 See the discussion in GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES
§403 (Rev. ed. 1940), of various specific problems involved in determining
where there is in fact a diminution of the insolvent estate.
25 47 W. Va. 361, 34 S. E. 13 (1899). W, insolvent, sold a stock of mer-
chandise to M, who paid no cash but gave his notes for the purchase price to
certain creditors of W.
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stitute a preference.2 6  Three months later the court decided
Armstrong v. Oil-Well Supply Co.$ a suit which grew out of the
Wolf case in which the liability of the purchaser to a creditor on
notes given for a part of the purchase price was involved. The
creditor was not a party to the Wolf suit at the time of its appeal
and defended on the ground that the note was given in considera-
tion of the release of ap attachment. The court not only held that
this was sufficient to furnish a present consideration for the note
and remove it from the status of a pre-existing debt, the soundness
of which seems questionable, but held that the decision in
Merchants &c Co. was directly in point and governed. This, to all
practical purpose, would seem to overrule the Wolf case.
At almost the same time Herold v. Barlow2 8 was decided. Here
the insolvent had sold certain real estate for a consideration which
included (a) payment by the purchaser of liens binding on the
land, (b) payment by the purchaser of certain general creditors
of the insolvent in cash and (c) credit to the purchaser on account
of antecedent debts due from the insolvent. As the case arose
prior to the amendment of 1"895 there was no applicable statute
of limitations and it was dismissed for laches in delaying the suit
for four years and four months. But the opinion expresses the
view that the purchaser would be protected for amounts expended
under (a) and (b), although as to (c) the conveyance was a prefer-
ence. The discharge of valid liens was certainly not a preference as
the creditors holding same received nothing they were not already
entitled to receive, the property having a value in excess of the
liens. But the other creditors who were paid by the purchaser
clearly received cash instead of the unsecured obligation of the
insolvent. The proceeds of the insolvent's estate were used to pay
them and the transaction was no different, in effect, than if the
insolvent had conveyed directly to them and they had sold the
6 This case also followed the erroneous doctrine of Mack v. Prince, 40
W. Va. 328, 21 S. E. 1014 (1895), to the effect that the motives of the debtor
were material in determining whether transfer was voidable as a preference.
Certainly in the case of a conve)ance fraudulent in fact, the intent of the
debtor is a determining factor, but the only inquiry regarding a preference
should be the effect of the transfer, i.e., whether it secures to the creditor
transferee an unfair share of the estate of the insolvent. First National Bank
v. Parsons, 42 W. Va. 137, 24 S. E. 554 (1896), which had held that the
fraudulent intent of the grantor was immaterial, was ignored, but Warren
Refining Co. v. Dyer, 101 W. Va. 452, 132 S. E. 877 (1926), now seems to firmly
establish the principle that a transfer may be voidable as a preference in the
absence of any fraudulent intent.
27 47 W. Va. 455, 35 S. E. 967 (March 24, 1900).
28 47 W. Va. 750, 36 S. E. 8 (April 7, 1900).
8
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property. The opinion assigns no reason why a payment in cash
would not constitute a preference but simply says that the purchaser
should be preferred because the insolvent could lawfully have paid
the unsecured creditors in cash.2 9 This begs the question.
While a court might be reluctant to force a purchaser, even
though a creditor, to lose actual cash paid to acquire the debtor's
property, this result could be avoided by impleading the creditors
who were preferred by payment from the purchaser, forcing them
to disgorge, and allowing the purchaser credit for the money paid.
And this is exactly what the court did in the next case decided
involving a similar situation. In Powers-Taylor Drug Co. v.
Faulconer,30 the insolvent sold his stock of goods and drug store
fixtures to a bank cashier, individually. The cashier assumed a
lien against the fixtures, paid off several execution lien creditors
and a note of the insolvent to the bank of which he was an officer.
This note appeared to be well secured by accommodation endorsers.
Immediately afterwards the purchaser sold a half interest in the
goods and fixtures for the amount of his original purchase. The
transaction was attacked both as a preference and as fraudulent in
fact. The trial chancellor set it aside on the latter ground, requiring
the purchaser to account to the attacking creditor for the full
purchase price.
Upon appeal the transaction was held a preference but not a
fraudulent transfer. The bank was required to account and pay to
the attacking creditor its pro rata share of the money it received
from the purchaser. Although the opinion relies upon Wolf v.
McGugin as authority for the proposition that a sale is a transfer
within the statute,31 it is evident from its context that some of the
29 Id. at 763. "I think too that as the Barlows paid to Hevner and others,
who were general creditors of Lockridge, valid debts, the Barlows would get
the benefit of them over other creditors even. Why? Because those creditors
could lawfully receive cash in payment of their debts, and also because the
Barlows furnished cash to pay them; and this is just the same as it would be
if paid to Lockridge."
30 52 W. Va. 581, 44 S. E. 204. Submitted January 23, 1902. Decided
March 28, 1903.
31 Note 23, supra. Poffenbarger says, 52 W. Va. 581, 589, 44 S. E. 204 (1903),
"The word sale. as used in this statute, is not expressly limited to a sale to the
creditor. Whether it is to be so limited, is a matter of construction, and the
construction of the statute ought to be such as to give it the effect intended by
the legislature, so far as that intent is made plainly m'anifest by the statute. The
force and effect of the statute ought not to be frittered away by refinement
and technicality. Certainly not, by mere play upon words. This statute is in
derogation of the common law, it is true, and ought not to be so construed as
to be carried beyond the purpose for which it was passed. But it ought to be
liberally expounded for the accomplishment of that salutary purpose, the
9
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court concurred only because they perceived a design and con-
spiracy among the debtor, the purchaser and the bank to prefer
the latter. The soundness of Merchants & Co. v. Whitescarver was
questioned but it was not overruled. 2 And the Armstrong and
Barlow cases were not mentioned.
But in Garner v. Martin,;3 decided ten years after Powers-
Taylor Drug Co. v. Faulconer, the court returned to the principles
of the Wolf case and applied them without equivocation. Here the
insolvent purchased a house and lot but the seller neglected to
secure and record a lien for the unpaid purchase money. The
debtor later sold to a third party, who, as a part of the consideration,
paid the original seller his debt. The object of the suit was to
require the seller thus preferred to distribute the money received
as a preference pro rata among the debtor's creditors. This relief
was allowed as against the contention that the statute did not
embrace the payment of a bona fide debt. As to this, the court said:
"Yet it does, when the payment is brought about through the
force of a transfer constituting an unlawful preference. The
statute directly prohibits the securing of a pre-existing debt
through any transfer by an insolvent debtor if the same oper-
ates as a preference over other creditors."
The Wolf and Drug Co. cases were cited but the Merchants & Co.
and companion decisions were 'ignored. This appears to be the
last decision upon a comparable state of facts.
If the Garner case is to be accepted as the present law, then it
follows that (a) Merchants &: Co. and companion cases are, in effect,
overruled, (b) preferences accomplished through sales, whether
to a creditor or an innocent third party, are under the ban of the
statute and creditors thus preferred may be required to account to
those left out of the distribution, and (c) a payment of a debt by a
purchaser as a part of the sales price is a preferential transfer.
But is a payment of a debt in money, made by an insolvent
debtor directly to the creditor, a preference? In the Herold- and
ratable distribution of the assets of an insolvent person among his creditors.
That is nothing more than equity, equality."
32 52 W. Va. 581, 586, 44 S. E. 204 (1903): "For the appellants, it is insisted
that the case is within the principle announced in Merchants & Co. v. Whites-
carver, 47 W. Va. 36 . . . . If the facts disclosed by the evidence placed this
case on the footing of the one just referred to, and made it necessary to pass
upon the soundness of that decision, I should be inclined to question it. It
enables an insolvent debtor to do indirectly what he is forbidden to do directly
by the plain and express language of the statute, namely, to turn his property
over to a part of his creditors to the exclusion of others."
33 73 W. Va. 407, 80 S. E. 495 (1913).
34 Note 26, supra.
10
West irginia Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 2 [1950], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol52/iss2/4
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS
Merchants & Co.-" cases a bald assumption that it was not was used
as a premise to rebut the proposition later expressly propounded by
the Garner case, that a payment in money by indirection was a
preference. No authority was ever cited to support the assumption,
and unless there is sound logic and reason to the contrary, a transfer
in money ought to be as much a preference as a transfer of any
other property. Certainly it diminishes the estate of the insolvent
no less, and this is the test under the Bankruptcy Act.:' While the
application of the rule under that act has sometimes occasioned
difficulty because of the seeming unfairness of its application to
particular situations, "7 it is now unquestioned that a payment in
money is a preferential transfer by a bankrupt if the other necessary
elements are present.3 s  Thus, unless there is an impediment in
the West Virginia statute itself, those creditors who receive payment
in money ought to be as liable to account as those who receive
real estate or other tangible property.
Does the proviso which excepts a transfer of "bonds, notes,
stocks, securities or other evidences of debt",3 19 embrace a direct
payment in money? The payment may be either in currency or by
check. If by the latter, no evidence of debt would change hands
as a check is a mere order on the drawee bank to pay, and is not an
35 Note 22, supra.
3G GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES §403; Continental Trust Co. v. Chicago
T. & T. Co., 229' U. S. 435 (1913); National Bank of Newport v. Herkimer
County Bank, 225 U. S. 178 (1912).
37 For example, the problems involved in the allowance of sets.off par-
ticularly as to bank deposits against notes held by a bank against the bankrupt
are illustrative. This set-off is allowed, unless the bank had "active" knowledge
of insolvency or "procured" the deposit. This peculiar rule is justified by Glenn
on the theory of the bank's duty as a public servant to accept deposits in the
ordinary course of business, although all the authorities deny that a bank is
a public utility. See GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES §407. Also the problem
concerning the status of payments on a running account, where many courts have
followed the "net-result" theory of diminution of the bankrupt estate. See the
discussion of GLENN, at §411. Under the present act no distinction as to running
accounts seems to be recognized. Campanella v. Liebowitz, 103 F.2d 252 (3d
Cir. 1939), 39 AM. B. R. (N.S.) 655 (1939). Likewise the question of payment
of "running expenses" of the business. This seems to hark back to the original
exception from a "fraudulent preference" of a payment in due course made
by Lord Mansfield in Rust v. Cooper, 2 Cowp. 269 (1777). GLENN, §411 places
the nonpreferential character of such payments on the ground that they con-
stitute a fair exchange of values and preserve the business as a going concern.
The present extent of the exception, if any, is doubtful.
38 See also, in general, REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY §1663 et seq. (5th ed. 1940).
39 Notes 7, 10, supra.
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assignment pro tanto of the bank's deposit liability to the drawer;4 °
but if the payment be by currency, a more difficult problem is
presented.
A considerable part of what passed for money in this country
was formerly in the form of demand notes. Bank notes, at one
time the chief form of this medium of exchange, were simply
promises to pay on demand. All of this circulation, except that of
national banks, was effectively curtailed in 1865 by the imposition
of a confiscatory tax of ten per cent.4' And such circulation by
national banks ceased about 1935 when the government redeemed
the only bonds eligible by law as security for the notes.
42
The currency 43 presently in circulation consists of gold cer-
tificates, 44 silver certificates, 4 5 United States notes,4 and Federal
Reserve notes. 47 All are equally legal tender.48  As such none of
them can be said to be an "evidence of debt" since, by legislative
fiat, their value as currency is independent of any obligation to pay.
They are themselves the medium in which any debt must be paid.
So that a transfer of currency cannot be a transfer of an "evidence
of debt" within the West Virginia statute.
The Garner opinion, although it does not mention the earlier
decisions to the contrary, and .does not expressly consider whether
40 W. VA. CODE c. 46, art. 16, §6 (1931); NEGOTIABLF INSTRUMENTS LAW §189.
"A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds
to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the
holder, unless and until it accepts or certifies a check."
41 13 STAT. 484 (1865), as amended 26 U. S. C. §1900 (b) (1946).
42 The statutory provisions governing the issue of circulating notes by
national banks were not repealed. See 12 U. S. C. §§101 et seq. (1946). In effect
Federal Reserve notes were substituted therefor. Act of March 9, 1933, c. 1,
§401, 48 STAT. 6 (1933), amended 12 U. S. C. §445 (1946) so that the Federal
Reserve banks could substitute their own notes for the bonds retired and which
secured the outstanding national bank notes. Having served its purpose it
was repealed by act of June 12, 1945, c. 186, §3, 59 STAT. 238 (1945).
43 48 STAT. 344 (1934), 31 U. S. C. §444 (1946) defines "currency of the
United States" as "currency which is legal tender in the United States, and
includes United States notes, Treasury notes of 1890, gold certificates, silver
certificates, Federal Reserve notes, and circulating notes of the Federal Reserve
banks and national banking associations."
44 48 STAT. 344 (1934), 31 U. S. C. §405b (1946); 48 STAT. 344 (1934), 31
U. S. C. §428 (1946). Redemption in gold is forbidden, 48 STAT. 340 (1934), 31
U. S. C. §408a (1946).
45 31 U. S. C. §§405, 405a, 406 (1946).
40 31 U. S. C. §§401-404 (1946). Issue limited to $382,000,000.00
47 12 U. S. C. §§411-414 (1946). These are direct obligations of the United
States and are redeemable in lawful money on demand at the Treasury, 38
STAT. 265 (1913), as amended, 12 U. S. C. §411 (1946).
48 48 STAT. 52 (1933), 31 U. S. C. §462 (1946), as amended, 48 STAT. 113
(1933), 31 U. S. C. §462 (1946). Prior to this act some were legal tender for
certain purposes only.
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a payment in money is within the statute, the case being considered
as if the property transferred itself was the medium of payment,
necessarily raises an inference that not only a preference created
through the indirect medium of a sale is within the ban, but that a
payment in money must be also because the property was converted
into money. Nevertheless, legislative clarification of the West
Virginia statute in order to assure an equitable distribution of the
property of an insolvent among his creditors, and in order to
eliminate any doubt as to its application to the situations discussed
herein would seem desirable.
Certainly the proviso excepting transfers of bonds, notes, etc.,
ought to be eliminated. There is no basis for it in principle. And
if this loophole be plugged, it would seem fair to add the require-
ment of the Bankruptcy Act 49 that the creditor must, at the time of
the transfer, have reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent.
This would seem enough to protect all "good faith" situations, and
we would then have a preference statute, roughly comparable to
the Bankruptcy Act in its scope and usefulness in state practice.
49 See note 13, supra.
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